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The article addresses the problem of how myth relates to rationality. In the classical formula-
tion, this question appears in the following manner: are mythos and logos opposites? It can 
be stated that myth has become one of the key themes of philosophy in the 20th century. It has 
been studied in ethnography and anthropology, cultural studies, art theory, political science 
and even in the theory of knowledge. Myth is understood not only as a special artistic form, 
but also a special form of intuition, form of thinking, and form of life. Despite the sometimes 
cardinal difference in approaches to the analysis of myth, one common feature in its under-
standing can be identified. Mythical thinking is considered either as irrational or as proto-
rational. For example, in Cassirer and Blumenberg, myth appears as an affective rationality, 
in Vico and Schelling — as a poetic rationality. The reason for this can be seen in the fact that 
myth is considered as a product of imagination. The latter is indisputable, but does this mean 
that myth and rationality are incompatible? In order to answer this question, the concept of 
imagination should be analyzed. Drawing on the theories of Hume, Aristotle, and Kant, the 
author contends that there is a special type of imagination referred to as “conceptual”, which is 
a human capacity of spontaneous production of concepts. The conceptual imagination seems 
to be a distinctive feature of human rationality. However, if this is so, then rationality is a 
condition of myth and not its counterpart. Myth and discursive thinking thus turn out to be 
merely different forms of realization of our human rationality, of which discursive imagina-
tion is the common basis.
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Introduction
One of the remarkable characteristics of intellectual reflection in the 20th century is 
its concern with the problem of myth, reflected in a multiplicity of approaches: ethno- 
and anthropological, psychoanalytical, cultural, political, epistemological, etc.1 Myth was 
a subject matter of philosophical meta-discourses in regard to the ways of cognition, hu-
man rationality, and foundations of culture, and it has been discussed as a special form 
of intuition, form of thinking, and form of life. These discourses demonstrate a very 
different understanding of myth, its place in the structure of human mentality, and its 
functions. 
* The author is grateful for the support provided by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grant 
number M 2590-G32.
1 For a lucid and helpful overview of the leading theories of myth, see Cohen [1], Stambovsky [2], Segal 
[3], Segal [4].
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Already from the above, it is clear that looking for a general definition of myth is 
a hopeless task. It cannot be clearly defined, but rather it can be interpreted in accord-
ance with the principle of “family resemblance” proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein. What 
various theories call “myth” has common, but elusive features. The meaning of this word 
depends on the context of its use and on the theory within which this phenomenon is ap-
proached. In other words, theory determines the content of the concept of ‘myth’. There-
fore, as a subject matter of the work, the term ‘myth’ is the terminus ad quem and it can 
initially be defined only in general. Myth can be understood as a literary genre like a le- 
gend, fable, tale, or utopia; it also can serve as a paradigm of social life. In addition, myth 
may be analysed from the epistemological point of view as a specific cognitive situation of 
the human being, and this seems to be the most fundamental function of myth. 
Despite the variety of its manifestations, myth reveals a constant quality: it is rooted 
in and inseparably connected with imagination. In short, myth is mostly seen as a product 
of imagination. The imagination is usually opposed to rational, formal-logical thinking 
with the result that myth appears as the opposite of logos. This situation has existed since 
ancient times and has not shown any significant changes until now. As a rule, the debate 
on myth is still guided with a dual logic highlighting such oppositions as rational/irra-
tional, reality/fiction, conscious/unconscious, reasonable/affective, episteme/doxa, true/
false, etc. 
In the history of philosophy there have already been numerous attempts to consider 
the terms ‘myth’ and ‘logos’ not as the opposites, but to put them in a genetic or a dialec-
tical relationship to one another — one thinks of Vico, Schelling, Cassirer, Levi-Strauss, 
Blumenberg and many others. One basic assumption remains unchangeable in all these 
approaches, namely the assumption that myth and logos are based upon two different 
forms of rationality. In Cassirer and Blumenberg, for example, myth is characterized by 
an affective rationality, in Vico and Schelling by a poetic rationality, etc. Most theories are 
in agreement that myth represents an immature, primary or deficient form of rationality, 
the culmination of which is seen in the discursive, inferential thinking. Hans-Friedemann 
Richter summarizes this state of affairs as follows: “In contrast to the logos, whose area 
is fundamentally accessible in a rational manner, the myth signals what people cannot 
rationally grasp in their limitations or consider unexplainable” [5, p. 25].
Against this background, myth seems to be an ideal candidate to raise the question of 
the nature of human rationality in general. In turn, the analysis of the rationality can be a 
promising starting point to call into question the nature and functions of myth once again. 
In my view, these questions can be answered meaningfully if one illuminates the role of 
imagination, which produces myth as such, and its relation to the discursive, inferential 
rationality. That is the purpose of my work and I shall begin this analysis with a brief ac-
count of imagination.
The concept of imagination
Imagination is involved in a wide variety of human activities, such as understand-
ing, memory, belief, desire, and it has been explored from a wide range of positions. 
Amongst the most discussed functions of imagination is its role in art, psychology and 
scientific cognition. Accordingly, different aspects of imagination become visible. For 
example, in the arts the faculty of imagination is understood, first of all, as a creative ac-
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tivity of human being, as a productive fantasy and thinking in and by means of images. 
Plato’s, Hume’s and Kant’s aesthetics, as well as Collingwood’s and Ricœur’s aesthetic 
theories are the important cornerstones, which formed a conceptual foundation for the 
European tradition in regard to this subject matter. In psychology, the main focus is, 
usually, on different disorders of imagination. That is, the destructive patterns of cog-
nition and behaviour that have been argued to result from different forms of psycho-
pathology associated with imagination, such as dreaming. The patriarch of this field is 
Freud who contributed to the question of the imagination’s relation to reflective thought 
and its place in forming neuroses2. Finally, philosophers give imagination a central role 
in the creative endeavour of science. Some of them argue that imagination is a constitu-
tive aspect of heuristic by highlighting its role in scientific discovery. Others refer to the 
thought experiments that are regularly used in scientific theorizing as being founded on 
imaginative capacities. For many, like Feyerabend, imagination is engaged in the pro-
cess of constructing our symbolic reality. 
The variety of roles ascribed to imagination provides a guide for discussions on the 
epistemic status of imagination. Here, the central epistemological questions are on the 
nature of imagination and its place in human cognition. There are two main points of 
disagreement regarding this issue. First, philosophers disagree about the origin and the 
sources of imagination and the strength of the connection between imagination and sen-
suality, on the one hand, and between imagination and understanding, on the other hand. 
Second, philosophers disagree about the type of imagination involved in creative pro-
cesses. Is this the same imaginative faculty, which is involved, for example, in a fictional 
narrative, in musical compositions and in promoting scientific hypothesises?3 
Despite immense differences between numerous imagination theories, they may be 
divided into two large groups, which can be defined as representational and logical. In 
the first case, imagination is considered to be supported by input obtained from actual 
perceptual — visual, auditory, haptic, kinaesthetic, etc. — experiences. This approach is 
challenged by the theories stating that imagining can occur without imagery. Here, imagi-
nation is interpreted as the emergence of meaning, or as meaning-giving. Both traditions 
have complicated histories, but they can be vividly illustrated by reference to the so-called 
paradigmatic representatives. They are Hume’s theory of imagination and, on the opposite 
pole, Aristotle’s and Kant’s conceptions of imaginations. Because of the breadth of the 
topic, the following analysis is limited to aspects allowing for clarification of the principal 
differences between these approaches.
A representational theory of imagination: Hume
In Hume’s theory of cognition, imagination plays a crucial role in all thought pro-
cesses and provides the basis for cognition. Before demonstrating this, it is important to 
remember that, according to him, all knowledge arises from experience and can only be 
2 A famous proponent of Freudian concepts emphasising the role of imagination in psychoanalysis 
was Jacques Lacan. 
3 Such fundamental studies on imagination as Murray Wright Bundy’s history of imagination [6], 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Psychology of the Imagination [7], Mary Warnock’s book Imagination [8], Dietmar 
Kamper’s studies on the history of imagination [9], Richard Kearney’s work The Wake of Imagination [10], 
Alan White’s The Language of Imagination [11] and John Cocking’s Imagination: A Study in the History of 
Ideas [12] build a basis for fruitful discussions on this issue.
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justified by experience. The first part of this proposition is formulated by Hume himself 
as the “first principle <…> in the science of human nature”: “<E>very simple idea has 
a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspond-
ent idea” (Treatise 1.1.1.5.30–31). The second part can be concluded from his famous 
argument that “the examination of the impression bestows a clearness on the idea; and 
the examination of the idea bestows a like clearness on all our reasoning” (Treatise 
1.3.2.4.32–34). Hume believes that “<t>is impossible for us to carry on our inferences 
in infinitum; and the only thing, that can stop them, is an impression of the memory or 
senses, beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry” (Treatise 1.3.4.1.28–30). 
In other words, he postulates a kind of the “Myth of the Given” (Sellars), namely that 
the process of cognition may not exceed beyond the bounds of experience. These two 
propositions construct the general conceptual framework within which the developing 
particular notions took place. 
The most fundamental means of cognition are “simple” impressions and “simple” ide-
as. An impression first affects the senses and makes people perceive the qualities of things. 
The mind makes a copy of this impression which remains after the impression ceases. 
Hume refers to such a copy as an “idea”. There is discussion on the question whether the 
ideas in his theory of cognition can be interpreted as pictorial images. In fact, A Treatise of 
Human Nature opens by explicitly identifying ideas with images: ideas are defined as “the 
faint images” of sensory impressions in thinking and reasoning (Treatise I. 1.1.1.7). This is 
sometimes understood literally and leads to the conclusion that Hume conceived the ideas 
picture-like. However, Hume refers also, for example, to the “ideas” of pleasure or pain 
(Treatise I. 1.2.2.8) and this allows us to suggest that the ‘copies’ here are not pictorial ima- 
ges. Rather, it is conceivable that “idea” might mean nothing more than merely ‘replica’, 
or ‘representation’. The passages just mentioned (and others like them) perhaps imply no 
more than that Hume thought of simple ideas as emerging from perceptual experiences 
and that the senses are only the channel through which these representations are con-
veyed. The concept of the idea as a ‘copy’ or, better, a ‘representation’ of sensual perception 
serves only to prove the primary position of sensuality in cognition. The further process 
of cognition occurs by means of thinking which consists of a connection of ideas of things 
and in a discovery of the relations that things have to one another. 
There are possible four types of epistemic situations: 1) Perception takes place when all 
objects of thought are present to the senses along with the relations between them: “we call 
this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, 
or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro’ the 
organs of sensation” (Treatise I. 3.2.2.35–38). 2) Knowledge in the strict sense of the word, 
that is, “certain” knowledge, takes place when the relations depend purely on the ideas 
(like in arithmetic or algebra) and can be either demonstrated or directly intuited. 3) Pro- 
bability takes place when one infers the idea of an object from an impression: “’Tis there-
fore necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, 
either seen or remember’d; and that from this we infer something connected with it, which 
is not seen nor remember’d” (Treatise I. 3.6.6.6–8). 4) Belief takes place when one infers 
the existence of one object from another. Here, one can speak solely about ‘belief ’ because 
such an inference “can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and 
senses” (Treatise I. 3.6.7.9–10), on the one hand, and we cannot give reasonable grounds 
for the connection of one object with another, on the other hand. 
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One paradigmatic case of the latter type of cognition is causation. Hume states that 
“the idea of cause and effect is deriv’d from experience, which informs us, that such par-
ticular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoin’d with each other (Trea-
tise I. 3.6.7.12–14). He defines causality as “constant conjunction” between objects (Trea-
tise I. 3.6.8.29) based on “custom” or “habit”. The idea is that if one has seen objects or 
events constantly conjoined, the mind is then inclined to project a similar regularity into 
the future, or into the analogous cases. Hume goes on to summarize the conclusion by say-
ing that there are “certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, 
and unite them in the imagination” (Treatise 1.3.6.12.33–34). Thus, it is the imagination 
which is taken to be responsible for connecting the impression or idea of one object to 
the impression or idea of another object, rather than understanding. The mechanism of 
imagination is association, not argumentative or inferential reasoning. 
In this theoretical architecture, one should distinguish between the imagination deal-
ing with the “complex” and imagination dealing with “simple” ideas. Hume announces or 
formulates the principle of liberty of imagination (Treatise 1.1.3.4.20–21) which is free 
to transpose, combine, rearrange, produce and change the “complex” — derived or com-
posed — ideas. This creativity is, for example, a characteristic of imagination in the field 
of phantasy. In contrast, the imagination dealing with “simple” ideas is restrained within 
the limits of experience and constrained by a relatively small set of permanent principles 
of imaginative association. Hume identifies three “general” (Treatise 1.3.6.13.49) princi-
ples of association: resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and causation. Imagina-
tion, functioning according to these principles, establishes “natural relations” among our 
ideas of objects. Hume says that although the associative principles’ “effects are every-
where conspicuous”, their causes “are mostly unknown, and must be resolv’d into original 
qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain” (Treatise 1.1.4.6.15–17). He 
claims that, as a matter of fact, we do associate ideas in these ways, but he does not try to 
explain why we associate ideas as we do. This gives us a reason to consider his approach 
descriptive. 
One remarkable feature of Hume’s theory is that he breaks down traditional distinc-
tions between thinking and imagining. Imagination is understood as a kind of judgement, 
as a conclusion based on the association of ideas (Treatise 1.3.6.15–16). It does not only 
assist thoughts to move rapidly from one idea to another in compliance with the princi-
ple of economy, but it is only so far as imagination produces a relatively stable structure 
among the ideas and a regular order to our thoughts that we are able to reason upon it, 
to draw any inference from it, or to make general empirical judgments. Causation, induc-
tion, etc., are the spheres of imagination. Thus, Hume endows imagination with cognitive 
functions. That is why he regards the principles of imagination as possessing equal weight 
and authority in the process of cognition based upon inferential reasoning. 
It is obvious that the Hume’s cognitive imagination has its own logic. However, this 
logic is not inherent in the very structure of imagination, but, rather, derived from the 
experience which “informs” the imagination about possible relations between things and 
events. Since this logic is imposed on the imagination externally, by physics, it is consti-
tuted through a representational mechanism. For this reason, one can conclude that in the 
Treatise Hume raises the problem of imagination in a radical way, but his solution shows 
some restrictions caused by his conviction in the heteronomy of imagination, that is, its 
dependence on sensuality. 
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Logical theories of imagination: Aristotle and Kant
Aristotle is another key scholar in regard to the problem of imagination since he 
has sometimes been accredited with the very invention of the concept of phantasia [13, 
p. 100]. It seems in any case fair to say that he developed the most influential conception 
of imagination which has been permanently discussed by philosophers with the result that 
“<A>fter over two millennia of discussion, scholars still do not agree about crucial aspects 
of Aristotle’s conception of phantasia, and thus about his view of the fundamental nature 
of imagery” [14]. The main question remains whether Aristotle’s phantasia, which is often 
translated as imagination, can be considered as a faculty that produces images.
Historically, the most widespread point of view is that, according to Aristotle, to ima- 
gine is to hold an image of perception in one’s mind, and an image is a mental substi-
tute for a real thing. Imagination resembles, then, perceptual experience, but it occurs in 
the absence of the appropriate external stimuli. Against the historical orthodoxy, some 
modern scholars have questioned the interpretation of ‘phantasma’ just as ‘image,’ in part 
because Aristotle does not always seem to identify phantasma with pictures, and also be-
cause he seems to think of them as playing an important role in perception itself [15; 13]. 
The last argument seems to be crucial and deserves further examination. In what follows, 
I shall discuss, in this vein, the concept of imagination as it was developed in the third 
book of De Anima. 
It is without doubt that there are two uses of this term. The first one, developed in 
chapter seven, was well-received and can be called conventional. Aristotle writes: “Images 
belong to the rational soul in the manner of perceptions, and whenever it affirms or denies 
that something is good or bad, it pursues or avoids. Consequently, the soul never thinks 
without an image” (De Anima iii 7, 431a15). In this quotation, he highlights the role of 
imaginary for practical reason and practical activity. An image, like perception, “except 
without matter” (De Anima iii 8, 432a5–10), is a representative of an object; and objects 
build an environment in which individuals live and operate. Because of this, the given-
ness of objects, both directly through perception and indirectly through imagination, is a 
necessary condition for the orientation in the world: “one who did not perceive anything 
would neither learn nor understand anything” (De Anima iii 8, 432a5–10). The suggestion 
is, thus, that phantasia is a faculty in humans (and most other animals) which produces 
pictorial (e. g., objects of appetite or danger) presentations used in a variety of activities, 
including those which motivate and guide action and cognition. 
Along with the conventional, representational, account of phantasia, this text includes 
passages allowing for the suggestion that this phenomenon may also have deep, logical 
functions. In the summary of his investigations into the nature of phantasia, in chapter 
eight, Aristotle states: “Consequently, the soul is just as the hand is; for the hand is a tool 
of tools, and reason is a form of forms, and perception a form of the objects of percep-
tion. Since there is nothing beyond perceptible magnitudes, as it seems, nothing separate, 
the objects of reason are in perceptible forms, both those spoken of in abstraction and all 
those which are states and affections belonging to the objects of perception” (De Anima 
iii 8, 432a1–10). Here, he seems to consider that there are two types of intelligible forms 
that underlay external objects and can be reconstructed. They are the concepts (eide) of 
perceived objects and intelligible forms which constitute perception itself. The former, the 
forms of objects, are conceived by reason (nous). In contrast, the latter are very enigmatic; 
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they can be identified as phantasmen and seem to play a central role in Aristotle’s theory 
of imagination. The arguments proving that Aristotle tends to treat imagination as a kind 
of rules for perception, which itself is “a form of the objects of perception”, can be found in 
chapter three.
In fact, at the very beginning of this chapter Aristotle criticizes philosophers who 
suppose that a grasp of an object “is corporeal, just as perceiving is, and that both perceiv-
ing and understanding are of like by like” (De Anima iii 3, 427a25–427b). In other words, 
he criticizes empirically oriented scholars who believe that reasoning perception is best 
thought of using the model of copies or likenesses of external objects. His main objec-
tion to the reduction of the image of an object to the sense perception is that perception 
is mostly true, whereas an image can be false (De Anima iii 3, 428a5–16). In his view, the 
faculty “in virtue of which we say that a particular image comes about for us” (De Anima 
iii 3, 428a1–2) is imagination, not sense perception. 
In a brief discussion dedicated to imagination, Aristotle is, for the most part, con-
cerned about distinguishing imagination from perception and reasoning. He distinguish-
es it from perception on a host of grounds, but his major argument seems to include the 
following aspects: because perception is due to single sense organs and always directed to 
special qualities of objects, it is never in error or admits the least possible amount of false-
hood. However, “perception is of something’s being an attribute of something; and already 
here it is possible to be mistaken. For one is not mistaken that there is white; but if one says 
that this or that other thing is what is white, one is mistaken” (De Anima iii 3, 428b20–25). 
From this passage, it follows that the errors that can occur in perception testify to the fact 
that the entire object is also co-perceived when individual single qualities are perceived. 
The emergence of an image is, hence, not restricted to the separate sensible qualities, but 
it always implies their association to the whole and their attribution to an object. More- 
over, perception is also directed to the “universal”, not only to the special, qualities of the 
‘attached’ objects. There are, for instance, motion and magnitude, concerning which, as 
Aristotle claims, the greatest amount of deception is possible. From this, it results that 
the emergence of an image also implies attribution to the ‘co-perceived’ objects of such 
characteristics which are not necessary explicitly conceived in an actual act of perception.
At first glance, the impression can arise that the imagination is introduced here just to 
explain the possibility of error but, in fact, this argumentation has a positive end result. It 
follows that imagination does not occur without sense perception and is not reducible to 
it. Imagination differs from perception in that perception receives separate sensual data, 
whereas imagination generates a coherent appearance. Imagination seems to realise a con-
ceptual design of perception in accordance with such “universal” characteristics (phantas-
men) as motion, magnitude, number, etc. As a unifying instance, imagination is neces-
sary for perceiving something as a total appearance against the variety of separate sense 
data. However, as further examination will show, imagination is not the same as belief (De 
Anima iii 3, 428a16–b10), knowledge, and reason (De Anima iii 3, 429a10–431a), since, in 
general, all these cognitive acts are connected with discursive reasoning and conceiving. 
From the above discussion a provisional conclusion can be drawn that imagination 
mediates between perception and thinking. This art of cognitive imagination can be in-
terpreted as a faculty to constitute appearances of objects by means of phantasmen. Here, 
phantasmen are not pictorial mental images that accompany thinking. Rather, they may 
be interpreted as certain forms of consciousness, as conceptual capacities which are ac-
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tualized in our perceptual experience. Phantasma appears to be a logical act of forming 
object, not an image of an object. 
This line of thought taken by Aristotle was not developed in philosophy until the 
publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) (compare [3, p. 81]). Kant considers 
the transcendental imagination as a necessary condition of knowledge and defines it as “a 
synthesis in general” (A78/B103). This “productive” synthesis transfigures the rhapsody of 
sense material into a certain form, which must be somehow available to discursive think-
ing and allow for cognition. Kant believes that it is the function of understanding to bring 
this pure synthesis of imagination “to concepts” (auf Begriffe) (A78/B103), that is, to give 
intuitions a conceptual character. Transcendental logic is supposed to explain how this 
comes about. 
Kant’s strategy is based on the following model: understanding thinks by combin-
ing concepts in a judgment. The objects to which these concepts refer are given in intui-
tions. It can be that either a perceived thing forms an intuition (like in Hume’s theory) or, 
conversely, an intuition forms how things are perceived. If the latter is accepted, it means 
that the intuitions themselves should have a conceptual character. In connection with this 
point, there is an ongoing vehement debate between the conceptualist and non-conceptu-
alist interpretations of Kant’s notion of intuition and the final solution to this puzzle has 
not been found yet4. In my view, Kant’s approach can be considered conceptual, but it does 
not mean that the primary concepts are already discursive and semantically specified. On 
the contrary, to be a concept in this original sense means nothing other than to be given as 
an object. All intuitions have in common — and this is their original general quality — that 
they are objects for a consciousness. In Kant’s words, their conceptual character consists 
in that they have the form of an “object in general”. This is precisely what the productive 
transcendental imagination does. 
Three steps seem to determine this process. First, Kant’s idea appears to be that that 
the representation having the form of an object can only arise in correlation to self-con-
sciousness. He claims that the synthetic unity of apperception is the necessary condition 
for the possibility of knowledge, because it “is a condition under which every intuition 
must stand in order to become an object for me” (B138). This thesis has the status of the 
“supreme principle” of all use of understanding (B136). In accordance to it, in order to be 
able to say that something is in one way or another, this something must exist as an object. 
This argument is, however, not illuminating and a subject of lively debate in recent 
works on Kant’s epistemology5. In my view, Kant’s explanation is based on the analogy 
between formal-logical and a priori judgment. In formal logic, the act of judging consists 
in generalisation, i. e., in the subordination of things under the already-given concepts. 
In this case, a concept represents things by means of a common quality. It is obvious that 
transcendental logic is founded upon the same procedure: the primary act of synthetic 
judgment a priori consists in the subordination of intuitions under the transcendental 
unity of apperception, i.e., under the unity of consciousness. In this process, the object 
maintains its primary definiteness not due to its belonging to the discursive “space of 
4 This is an extensive bibliography of continental and analytical philosophy of this discussion that can-
not be listed here. Two collections of papers edited by Dietmar Heidemann [16] and Dennis Schulting [17] 
are representative of it.
5 One of the recent publications on this topic, edited by Giuseppe Motta and Udo Thiel [18], provides 
an overview of the discussed problems.
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reasons”, as it is often assumed, but solely as a result of its being subject to the transcen-
dental unity of consciousness. In other words, its specification proceeds not by virtue of 
explicit or implicit classification à la Aristotle, but structurally-topologically. To be an ob-
ject means merely to be an identical unity for a subject and to have a clear location on that 
subject’s mental map6.
Second, these formal procedures must be applied to the sense data. Kant claims that 
the manifold of sensual data must be given in “one empirical intuition” (B143). This means 
that images are perceived as already organized and structured. For this, the manifold of 
intuitions must be brought to a “consciousness in general”, or, to a single mind. The catego-
ries fulfil this function. Kant considers the categories “functions” of pure understanding, 
and this presupposes, in turn, that understanding is originally a unity (B131). One exam-
ple can be instructive for demonstrating how this model works: if I make the empirical 
intuition of a house, argues Kant, its synthetic unity “has its seat in the understanding, 
and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition in general, i. e., 
the category of quantity, with which that synthesis of apprehension, i. e., the perception, 
must therefore be in thoroughgoing agreement” (B162). The empirical synthesis of ap-
prehension presupposes, hence, the transcendental synthesis. Kant attributes “a faculty for 
determining the sensuality a priori and its synthesis of intuitions in accordance with the 
categories” to the “productive” imagination (B152). It is the “transcendental synthesis of 
the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility,” that provides the 
prior structuring of our perceptions and configures intuitions. For this reason, Kant calls 
it “figurative”. 
However — and this is the third step of bringing imagination “to concepts” — catego-
ries, Kant states, cannot be applied directly to intuitions, since they are incommensurable. 
Therefore, a mediator is needed which is partly intelligible and, at the same time, partly 
material. Kant proposes that a transcendental schema mediates between sensuality and 
understanding. This part of Kant’s theory of cognition is, probably, the most puzzling and 
can hardly be explained in a few words7. But one basic point of it should be quite clear: the 
schema is not a picture and it “can never be brought to an image at all” (B 181), but rather 
a rule of pure synthesis, expressed by a category. The schema represents the “sensible con-
cept of an object” (B186), the basis of which is time determinations. For instance, the 
generation of time in the apprehension of perception due to the successive addition of one 
homogeneous unit to another is the schema of magnitude; the filling of time is the scheme 
of reality; the persistence of the real in time is the scheme of substance; the succession of 
the manifold according to a certain rule is the scheme of causality (A143/B182, A145/
B184). Thus, categories and intuitions share time as a common feature. The mechanism of 
realising categories through the schemata of sensuality consists in the transmission of out-
er sense into an inner sense, whereby the schema in itself is “always only a product of the 
imagination” (A140/B179). It is clear that Kant’s transcendental imagination is restricted, 
similar to Hume’s imagination, but, in contrast to Hume, this limitation is imposed not by 
objects themselves, but by human cognitive capacities. It is the schemata of sensibility that 
limit the categories “to conditions that lie outside the understanding” (B186).
6 For more information, see Soboleva [19].
7 There are many publications on this topic. Since it is not relevant to enter into a discussion on this 
subject matter, it is sufficient to mention the fundamental and promising research of Matthias Wunsch [20] 
and Gerhard Schwarz & Matthias Wunsch [21].
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These three moments outline the basis for Kant’s transcendental-logical theory of 
“productive” imagination. It is remarkable that Kant paraphrases Hume by saying that he 
cannot explain more about the imagination, which remains “a blind though indispensable 
function of the soul without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are 
seldom even conscious” (A78/B103).
Conceptual imagination
What do we learn from these theories of imagination? Probably, the most informative 
lesson is that to imagine is not only to represent something as a picture in the absence of 
any corresponding perception but that imagination can also be interpreted as absolute and 
original, one that produces images for the first time. In this primordial sense, imagina-
tion can be interpreted as a mechanism of awareness of the world. In this case, “to imag-
ing something” is equivalent to “being aware of something”. As appears from the short 
philosophical-historical overview in the previous chapter, there can be different strategies 
of this type of argument: in Hume, imagination connects the ideas of objects in a “natural” 
way and also allows for exceeding the frame of experience and converting experience into 
a new (hypothetical) knowledge. In Aristotle, who argued that phantasia is at work even 
in a normal sensory experience like seeing, and in Kant, who claimed that the imagination 
acts “immediately upon perceptions” (A120), imagination enables experience as such and, 
hence, the phenomena themselves come into existence for the first time due to imagination. 
Imagination, as can be concluded by referring to Aristotle’s and Kant’s theory, creates 
the specifically human image of the world, that is, the image of the world in conformity 
with the conceptual structure of the human mind. It takes raw materials and produces 
outputs that transcend concepts possessed by human understanding. Here, under the con-
cepts one should understand neither an abstraction of features that belong to things nor 
any other discursive contents. They are just the functions of a being-conscious-of-some-
thing via perceiving something as something. In this case, imagination means a conceptual 
imagination, which is the imagination of form and order, without necessarily becoming 
separated from logical operations on the one hand. On the other hand, since this kind of 
imaginative activity is non‐propositional and non‐linguistic it cannot be identified with 
reasoning which provides the perceptual experience with a definitive semantic content. 
With this result, one is certainly at the limit of what can be implicitly inferred from 
the analysed texts. Nevertheless, it would not be sufficient to say that conceptual imagina-
tion is only confined to an application of logical rules to sensual data. Aristotle, Hume and 
Kant characterize the human mind also as the ability to spontaneously generate concepts and 
thoughts. This ability is taken by these philosophers for granted and not thematised. Their 
primary concern is, rather, to restrain the thinking within the framework of experience in 
order to avoid unfounded speculations and achieve verifiable knowledge. However, from 
this ‘negative’ strategy, it can be concluded that there is also a mind activity that can be inter-
preted as one more variant of conceptual imagination consisting in the production of con-
cepts (ideas, etc.) and discourses8. Taken together, these two aspects — the non-discursive 
and the discursive — seem to be fundamental for the conceptual imagination.
8 It is, particularly, hermeneutics that analyses the knowledge as ‘knowing one thing as something 
of a certain kind through productive articulation’. This approach can be found in Plato and was developed 
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To conclude, these classical theories of imagination propose the general view that our 
human imagination is basically conceptual. The conceptual imagination belongs to our 
cognitive capacities and, in this role, enables a primary constitutive interpretation of the 
world. However, the term ‘interpretation’ does not mean a theoretical or reflective repre-
sentation. On the contrary, this term is to be understood as a spontaneous differentiation 
of things9 as well as spontaneously giving them a meaning, and spontaneous, enactive 
producing meaningful relationships. It points to the process of distinguishing and iden-
tifying something as ‘this-such’ due to which the world takes on a tangible contour and 
universal, ‘natural’ image, which is a starting point for reflections and cognition. 
Conceptual imagination, rationality and myth
The notion ‘conceptual imagination’ seems to be a promising resource for rethink-
ing both the concept of human rationality and theory of myth, and giving them a new 
view. If it is accepted that the faculty of spontaneous production of concepts without the 
ontological support of images or external objects is an anthropological characteristic of 
the human being, principal and equally controversial questions about the nature of the 
human rationality cannot be posed any more exclusively in terms of discursivity, proposi-
tionalism, inference and expediency10. In fact, a theory of rationality that restricted itself 
to formal-logical, deductive and referential procedures would be radically incomplete, 
since it would exclude the factor of productive interpretative activity of human beings. 
For this reason, it is impossible to isolate imagination from the other cognitive capacities 
of humans and consider them either mutually exclusive or in competition with each other. 
On the contrary, the original productive conceptual imagination should be recognised as 
a genuine creative part of human mind, the very foundation and, most probably, the dif-
ferentia specifica of human rationality. 
The difference between conceptual and imaginative thinking is, then, based on the dif-
ference in the forms of articulation and presentation of the issue in question. However, both 
types of thought stem from the same productive faculty, the primary conceptual imagina-
tion, which is constitutive for our basic experience since it generates the unified sensory ap-
pearance of the world and provides the prior structuring of our perceptions at the most basic 
level of meaning-making. There can, finally, be only one and the same reason having differ-
ent applications and realisations. The uniform human reason, the source of which is con-
ceptual imagination, underlies scientific thinking as well as the mythical and artistic fantasy. 
On this theoretical basis, the question of myth as the opposite of rationality can be 
finally be resolved. In contrast to the traditional opposition which is still preserved in the 
majority of modern theories of myth, myth can be interpreted as a form of rationality pro-
vided that the latter is not reduced to its positivist, inferential-discursive, formula. Indeed, 
if human reason is inevitably imaginative, it is no longer reasonable to set apart myth 
from rationality by giving emphasis to the criterion of being a product of imagination11. 
by Dilthey, Heidegger, Misch, and Koenig who challenged the traditional theory of knowledge which was 
oriented to propositional thinking.
9 Here, ‘thing’ is what we mean by the word ‘something’.
10 Rationality was a subject matter of lively debates in the seventies of the twentieth century in Germany 
due to Habermas and Appel. However, since that time it has not become the focus of philosophical interest. 
11 Compare to the opinion of Kieran Egan’s who believes that “seeing the imagination as something 
that plays a constant role in perception makes it a potential contributor to rational thought” [22].
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The contrast between discursive reasoning and myth is merely that the latter is a practical 
and poetic mode of realisation of the capacity of conceptual imagination. This premise 
can be a starting point for developing a systematic conceptual frame for the myth and the 
so-called mythical thinking.
Specifically in reference to myth, the problem of mental imagery and the possible 
roles that imagination might play can be approached from a new perspective. Even for 
myth, imagination should not be considered by its sensible aspect, but rather by its logical 
aspect given that the latter is the condition of the former. Thus, we first have to under-
stand (grasp) something before we create an image of it. In other words, before becoming 
a sensual representation, the ‘image’ is an emerging meaning. Any mythical image is an 
expression of a meaning (idea) and exists as long as this meaning is valid, not vice versa. 
Mythical images are the poetical language of conceptual imagination12. The idea (mean-
ing, concept) is primary: that is the point. Human being’s faculty of productive ‘this-such-
thinking’ can be conceived as an anthropological condition of the possibility of myth.
Myth sets out the key aspects of conceptual imagination: seeing as, non-discursive-
ness, and non-inferential creativity which is not limited by any ‘natural’ rules. The speci-
ficity of myth is that it is precisely the kind of assessment of the world that denies the 
distinction between representation and sense. In myth, to think in and through images 
is, at the same time, to think in and through meanings (ideas, concepts). It operates with 
imaginary concepts, or, conversely, with conceptualised images. This means that it ope- 
rates with symbols, as Ernst Cassirer famously put it. 
One of the most important properties of mythical symbols is their ability to generate 
new symbols that can express the meaning of the primary symbol. Correspondently, the 
logic of myth can be characterised as the self-developing logic of a sense. This kind of logic 
neither reflects the structures of the external reality in itself, nor is it a product of an infer-
ential calculus. It is, rather, the logic of conceptual imagination in its creative proceeding 
to knowledge and sense on the way of explicating meaningful relations. 
Of course, this analysis of myth is very schematic and not complete. Therefore, it is 
worth reiterating that the present aim is only to draft a framework within which myth 
could be construed not as an alter ego of rationality, but as its specific integral part. This 
framework is, I claim, the conceptual imagination.
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Проблема, на решение которой нацелена данная статья, состоит в  том, как соотно-
сятся мифическое мышление и рациональность. В классической постановке вопроса: 
являются ли миф и  логос противоположностями? Можно сказать, что миф стал од-
ной из  ключевых тем философии XX  в. Он изучался в  этнографии и  антропологии, 
культурологии, теории искусства, политологии и даже в теории познания. Под мифом 
понимают не только особую художественную форму, но и форму созерцания, форму 
познания и форму жизни. Несмотря на порой кардинальную разницу в подходах к ана-
лизу мифа, можно указать на одну общую черту в его понимании. Мифическое мышле-
ние рассматривают или как иррациональное, или как проторациональное. Например, 
у Кассирера и Блюменберга миф выступает как аффективная рациональность, у Вико 
* Работа выполнена при поддержке Австрийского научного фонда (Austrian Science Fund 
(FWF)), номер гранта M 2590–G32.
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и Шеллинга — как рациональность поэтическая. Причину этого можно видеть в том, 
что миф представляют как продукт воображения. Последнее бесспорно, но означает 
ли это, что миф и рациональность несовместимы? Для того, чтобы ответить на этот 
вопрос, следует рассмотреть само понятие воображения. Опираясь на теории Юма, 
Аристотеля и  Канта автор показывает, что есть особый тип воображения, который 
она называет понятийным. Это способность человека к  спонтанному производству 
понятий. Понятийное воображение автор интерпретирует как отличительную черту 
рациональности человека. Но если это так, то и миф стоит рассматривать только при 
условии того, что человек всегда уже мыслит рационально. Миф и дискурсивное мыш-
ление оказываются, таким образом, различными формами реализации нашей рацио-
нальности, основанием которой является дискурсивное воображение.
Ключевые слова: миф, понятийное воображение, воображение, рациональность, Ари-
стотель, Юм, Кант.
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